I I n nt tr r o od d u uc ct ti i o on n T aiwan's legislative and presidential elections in January and March 2008 marked a turning point in the country's political development. With the accession of Ma Ying-jeou to the presidency of the Republic of China (the official name for Taiwan), the Chinese Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT) has recaptured executive power after eight years of administration by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Backed by its increased majority in Parliament, the KMT now has full power to implement its programme. Looking beyond results, these elections also mark a resounding success for Taiwanese democracy and its consolidation. Unlike 2004, when defeated KMT candidates challenged the results with street demonstrations and legal manoeuvres even though the organisation of the polling had been exemplary, this year's presidential election took place without incident, and the result was immediately accepted by the DPP. The KMT's victory brings a second switch of power in eight years, and confirms the bedding down of democratic institutions and practices on the island. In this article, we will look back at the legislative elections before analysing in detail the results of the presidential poll and the lessons to be drawn from it. Finally, we will examine the challenges that the new president confronts over the economy, relations with China, and national identity.
(1)
L Le eg g i is s l la a t ti iv v e e e e l le e c ct ti i o on ns s
A An na al ly ys si is s o of f t th he e r re es su ul lt ts s
The elections for the new Taiwanese parliament, the Legislative Yuan (LY), were held on 12 January 2008. The poll presented some new developments compared with earlier elections. Only 113 seats were at stake, the number halved since the last election, and legislators faced a term of four years as against three previously. The voting system was also changed, the multi-member constituency system (2) having been abandoned in favour of a "single-member district, two vote" system. Seventy-three deputies were directly elected in single-member constituencies, while a separate vote distributed 34 seats proportionally to political party lists, and six seats were reserved for Taiwan's aboriginal minority. At the same time, two referendums were held, one over the assets of the KMT (tabled by the DPP) and the other calling for action against corruption (tabled by the KMT). The results gave a substantial victory to the KMT, which for the constituency vote brought under its name the whole of the Pan-Blue coalition (made up of the KMT, the People First Party -PFP -and the Chinese New Party -NP).
With 53.5 percent of the votes, the KMT and the PFP won 81 seats out of 113, exceeding two thirds of the new parliament. With the additional support of four independent representatives, the Pan-Blue camp now controls up to three quarters of the LY, which gives it control over the country's legislation unequalled since the early 1990s. The DPP, on the other hand, suffered its worst defeat in 20 years, returning only 27 seats despite a relatively strong total of 38.17 percent of the votes. The KMT's LY victory was expected. By itself or with its allies in the Pan-Blue camp, the KMT has actually won every legislative election in Taiwan since the country was democratised. Its long domination of Taiwan and its bedrock support within local politics, including a good voting network ensured by control of numerous local factions and associations, give it a definite electoral advantage. Opinion polls before the election had also predicted a KMT victory. Yet, the scale of the party's success came as a surprise, especially in terms of seats. Further analysis provides several explanations for this. First, there were technical reasons. Because of the reduction in the number of representatives, and in order to guarantee that the Legislative Yuan included representatives from each county (xian) and municipality, the rules on equal political representation (prescribing one representative for every 300,000 electors approximately) were stretched a little to give one seat each to the less populated counties in East Taiwan (Hualien, Taitung) and the islands in the Strait of Formosa (Kinmen, Matsu, Penghu). The six seats reserved for aboriginal candidates also far exceed their demographic weight (the aborigines are 2 percent of the population). The traditional PanBlue inclinations of all these constituencies required the DPP to win decisively in the rest of the country, an unlikely prospect given the general structure of the electorate and the local predispositions in Taiwanese elections. The DPP itself only hoped to win at best 30 to 35 of the disputed constituencies by majority vote, an insufficient result to secure a majority in parliament.
(3) Finally, the system of first-past-the-post tends to exaggerate the results in terms of seats; in a sense, it offers additional rewards to the winners. But while the new voting system considerably widened the gap in terms of seats, it cannot be blamed for the DPP's defeat. That was caused first and foremost by changes in the numbers of votes won by the competing camps. It would be deceptive to take into account only the DPP's and the KMT's results. In the constituency vote, the KMT achieved an increase of 20.7 percent compared with 2004, when it was competing with the PFP and the NP for the same electorate. The DPP on its side saw its share of the electorate grow by 2.5 percent, a result that has to be considered positive. In terms of the two camps, on the other hand, the Pan-Blue vote increased by 6.9 percent, while that of the Pan-Greens (that is, the DPP and the Taiwanese Solidarity Union, TSU) fell by 4.4 percent. Furthermore, while the gap between the camps favoured the Pan-Blues by only 3.3 percent in 2004, it jumped to 14.7 percent this time. The DPP made progress, but it did so essentially at the expense of the TSU, whose votes fell by 6.8 percent.
The gap between the two camps was reflected in the results of the voting on party lists. The slight fall in the KMT vote was made up by the NP's votes (3.95 percent), bringing the Pan-Blues an overall total of 55.2 percent. The TSU's 3.5 percent added to the DPP's 37 percent pushed the Pan-Green camp past the 40 percent mark. With less than 5 percent of the votes, however, neither the NP nor the TSU -or any other small partywill be represented in the new Parliament. The Pan-Blue camp not only won a clear victory in percentage terms, both in comparison with the Pan-Greens and with the independents (whose total fell by 2.54 percent), it also increased its tally by more than 760,000 additional votes. This advance marks a turning point in recent political history by reversing the continuing decline the Pan-Blues had been suffering since 1995. Their success in the legislative elections of 2004 had actually been somewhat deceptive: while the Pan-Blue camp kept its parliamentary majority, it lost 2.89 percent of its support and more than 580,000 individual votes -historically, its worst-ever performance. This time, by contrast, it regained voting levels equal to its success in the legislative elections of 1998, which preceded the rise to power of Chen Shui-bian and the DPP. Conversely, the PanGreen camp has lost more than 350,000 votes in four years, and 370,000 votes compared with the elections in 2001. A detailed analysis of the turnout also gives us a more qualified picture of the abstention rate. In percentage terms, the turnout dropped once again to a record low of (40. 4 percent) may be considered its new electoral base after eight years in power. It represents a real improvement compared with the 1990s, and reflects the overall increase in support for the Pan-Greens, from 30-33 percent during the 1990s to 40-43 percent during the 2000s. The fluctuating performance of both camps in legislative elections can therefore be explained by the their ability to mobilise their own supporters while attracting a proportion of the undecided. In any case, assuming the PanBlues' regular potential to be higher than that of the PanGreens, barring exceptional circumstances, a victory for the Pan-Greens in parliamentary elections would remain difficult to achieve in the near future, especially in the context of the new electoral system. C Ca au us se es s a an nd d c co on ns se eq qu ue en nc ce es s o of f t th he e K KM MT T' 's s w wi in n The first reasons behind the KMT's victory are its closer union with its allies and its greater mastery of the new voting system. After 15 years of division within the Pan-Blue camp, the KMT has at last succeeded in creating a solid electoral alliance with its partners, the PFP and the NP, thanks to a nominating process that gave the parties adequate representation and avoided any new fratricidal battles: 20 deputies -25 percent --of the 80 candidates elected under the KMT banner are former PFP or NP members, to whom is added one PFP aboriginal candidate. This union was the condition for victory in a majority single-ballot electoral system, in which a divided camp usually turns out to be the poll's loser. The KMT was also able to field candidates with good local connections, and as always, it based its campaign on the local needs and concerns --particularly the economic concerns --of the population.
The Pan-Greens, by contrast, have flaunted their divisions. The disagreements between the DPP and the TSU prevented an effective electoral alliance and demobilised a proportion of their electorate. In addition there were rifts within the DPP, illustrated by a stormy nomination process that ultimately benefited the party's more radical wing. At least three safe Pan-Green seats in the south were thus lost because of a dissident TSU or DPP candidate. With a voting system requiring parties to raise the greatest number of votes, rather than merely gathering grass roots support as with the old system, the party's rejection of its own centrist candidates was clearly counter-productive in terms of both the party's image and the appeal of its candidates. In the end, the DPP lost all 11 of its marginal constituencies, as well as four constituencies it previously thought safe --this on top of the three lost through dissident activity. By comparison, the Pan-Blues held every one of the constituencies where they had majorities in 2004. At bottom, the KMT's success is linked to two main causes: Firstly, the dissatisfaction of the Pan-Green and centrist electorate with the government and with President Chen Shui-bian, and secondly, the desire to see the KMT back in government, mainly because of its reputation for economic competence. Despite good economic indicators (5.7 percent growth and 3.9 percent unemployment in 2007), the stagnation and even reduction in the purchasing power of a proportion of the middle and poorer classes, as well as the continuing delocalisation of Taiwanese enterprises into China, have given people a sense of economic crisis. Such fears were intensified last year in the context of rising world energy and food prices and costlier housing. Lastly, the DPP is paying for the tarnishing of its image as a clean party in the wake of a series of corruption scandals that have implicated associates of the President and the government since mid-2005. Corruption has always been a major concern among Taiwanese people in their electoral choices. In a campaign whose few national themes have focused --as in previous elections --on national identity (a DPP strength) and on the economy and governmental competence (KMT strengths), the Pan-Blues succeeded in reversing previous perceptions of their own corruption, and turned the anti-corruption theme against the DPP. In this 4. One explanation is the persistent habit of registering at the electoral office near the family home, and not the one near the individual's home. Thus, a large number of students and young workers originating from the centre and the south but living in the north are unwilling or unable to return to their parents' home for the legislative elections. By contrast, when it comes to the presidential elections, they do generally make the trip.
5. 1998 witnessed a very high percentage of votes going to independent candidates.
context, the record abstentions also reflect the desire of PanGreen and centrist voters to teach the DPP a lesson. Among its supporters, the DPP also finds itself reproached, on the one hand, with not having sufficiently advanced the pro-independence programme, and with having failed to recover the unwarranted assets of the KMT or to change the system of local pro-KMT factions; and on the other hand for having failed to undertake the progressive reforms it promised in the political, social, and environmental fields.
Some of these failures are due to opposition by the PanBlue-controlled parliament, which since 2001 has practised political sabotage aimed at blocking DPP policy; (7) even so, the government has ultimately been held responsible because of its own mistakes and its perceived lack of administrative and economic competence. The combined effect of the new voting system and the January results has had noteworthy consequences for the parliament. Firstly, the control of three quarters of the seats by the KMT and its allies has given them complete legislative freedom. The system enabling parliamentary committees to check and approve bills before the chamber votes on them can only delay their eventual enactment. The Pan-Blue camp will also be able to unilaterally launch the process for revising the constitution (though subject to popular approval in a referendum). A new political landscape defined by twoparty politics -or even by single-party politics, given the DPP's great weakness in parliament -could, in turn, lead to a revival of KMT factions and conflicts of interest, complicating the future Pan-Blue government's business. The reduction in the number of constituencies also favours the rise of individual power among deputies, their collusion with local and national lobbies, and the creation of personalised political machines to ensure their re-election. Because of the ever-increasing cost of electoral campaigns in Taiwan, incumbent representatives will thus enjoy a strong advantage in 2012, while the parties' control over their own deputies is likely to decline. Yet, the large number of voters with no political affiliations raises other possibilities. The DPP might make a comeback by basing its message on the voters' needs; alternatively, a third party might emerge, profiting either from possible socioeconomic problems that transcend the present political polarisation, or from new divisions within the KMT. As for the two referendums proposed to voters on 12 January, the KMT boycott prevented the required 50 percent participation in both cases.
(8) This failure proved once again that referendums cannot work in Taiwan unless both camps agree on the question in advance; and it portended a similar outcome for the more controversial referendum proposed during the presidential election, on whether Taiwan should join or return to the UN.
P Pr r e es si i d d e en nt t i ia a l l e el l e ec ct t i io on ns s
A An na al ly ys si is s o of f t th he e r re es su ul lt ts s The shock inflicted on the DPP by its failure in the elections to parliament allowed some to expect a pendulum effect to operate in the presidential elections to counterbalance the KMT's excessive power in the chamber. Yet, that would require the DPP to recover undecided voters along with its own moderate electors who had abandoned it in January. The DPP would also need to confront the voters' desire for an end to the standoff in power between the executive and the parliament that a KMT presidency would bring. In any case, only a very high turnout, above 80 percent, could have produced an outcome that favoured the Pan-Greens, faced as they were with a Pan-Blue camp whose structural and tactical advantage was doubled by offering one of the most popular and media-friendly candidates in Taiwan's democratic history. The challenge for Hsieh was to adequately distance himself from Chen Shuibian and his administration while at the same time projecting himself as the best guarantor of Taiwanese identity and socioeconomic recovery, and unifying a Pan-Green camp divided between factions, tactics, and opposing strategies. In the end, the election finished with an outright victory for Ma, with 58.45 percent of the vote (7.6 million) as against 41.55 percent (5.4 million) for his opponents. While the win for Ma and Siew was both expected and forecast, its extent did surprise most pundits, as well as the politicians of both the DPP and the KMT. Admittedly, opinion polls had indicated a gap quite close to the eventual 17 percent; but the repeated underestimate of Pan-Green votes by public opinion polls before previous elections, as well as the parties' generally more reliable private polling, had suggested a less easy victory. (9) In any event, the Taiwanese made a clear choice in favour of Ma and the KMT, with their programme for closer economic interaction with China and for maintaining the political status quo in the Taiwan Strait. This confirmation of the January vote challenged the widespread notion that legislative elections and presidential elections obey different logic. In fact, the same causes produced the same effects: voters expressed both their rejection of President Chen Shuibian's DPP government and their wish to give KMT leaders the means to implement their policies. Concurrently with the presidential vote, two important referendums for Taiwan's international relations were held. The first, tabled by the DPP, appealed for the country to join the UN under the name of Taiwan. The second, tabled by the KMT, proposed that Taiwan should return to the UN under the name of the Republic of China (ROC) or any other acceptable name. While the DPP called for yes votes in both referendums to ensure that at least one should succeed, the KMT decided to actively boycott the DPP proposal and mildly support its own without calling on supporters to vote. Contrary to the expectations of some and the fears of others, notably in Beijing and Washington, the referendums did not play a central role either in the campaign or in the final result of the presidential vote. With a mere 36% turnout for each of them, both were invalided. The KMT and its Pan-Blue voters preferred to ignore the strategic value of the referendums for future negotiations with China as well as their value in the expression of identity, because of their potential to provoke, because the US had openly opposed holding them, and because they felt the referendums were politically manipulated towards partisan ends. Still more than 6 million electors took part in both referendums. As in the January referendums, this was more than had voted for the DPP in the election. If we compare the 2008 results with those in earlier presidential elections, we can identify some of the reasons for Ma's victory. To do that, we must compare the strength of the Pan-Blue and Pan-Green camps rather than the individual candidates: this is because of the divisions within the Pan-Blue camp since the start of the 1990s Compared with 2004, when Chen and Lu Hsiu-lien won by only a whisker over Lien and Soong, one may note that the votes for the Pan-Blue candidate rose by more than 1.2 million, while those for the Pan-Green candidate dropped by a million. In effect, a million votes were transferred from the Pan-Greens to the Pan-Blues. In terms of geographic share, Ma dominated almost the whole country, including the symbolically important municipalities of the south, Chiayi, Tainan, and Kaohsiung; only five counties in the centre and the south (Yunlin, Chiayi, Tainan, Kaohsiung, and Pingtung) showed a slight majority for Hsieh. In 2004, Chen won all the counties and cities of the south with very large majorities, as well as the key counties of Changhua, Nantou, Taichung, and Ilan; this enabled him to counterbalance the traditional Pan-Blue majorities in the north and north-west. The turnout, at 76.33 percent, was down by four points. That may be explained partly by the fact that the results were largely predictable compared with previous presidential elections, but partly also because the polarisation of politics had caused a growing proportion of the electorate to lose interest. Yet, reflecting the growth of the registered electorate (+ 814,443), the number that actually voted was roughly equal to that in 2004, down by only 30,000 votes. While the election attracted proportionately fewer voters, the number of electors remained steady at 13.2 million, indicating very strong mobilisation of Pan-Blue and Ma supporters, as well as rank-and-file Pan-Greens. Looking back to 2000, the picture is slightly different. Chen and Lu had won their first mandate thanks to the Pan-Blue camp's division between three candidates.
(11) If the support behind the Pan-Blue candidates in 2000 is added together, the result is close to the recent total: 7.6 million and 60.2 percent of the vote for the Pan-Blues, as against nearly five showed. Now, many of these unpoliticised electors are also in the geographical centre of the island -that is, in the counties of Taichung, Changhua, Nantou, and Yunlin -and they tend to offer their support to the incumbent candidate or to a probable winner. Another floating sub-group is that of new electors, mainly young people, who on the whole are less politicised and committed than their predecessors. Their votes are dictated more by present conditions, and they are sensitive to what is new, and to promises that their future will be improved. didate who could embody the electorate's desire for change and progress; and lastly, adopting an electoral programme and a message that took into account voters' wishes and the sociopolitical development of recent decades in terms of democratisation and Taiwanisation, and at the same time that might take advantage of disappointment with the DPP.
As in January, the main reasons for the KMT's win in March were thus voters' rejection of Chen and the DPP government, and the desire for a change of team after two terms under the Pan-Greens. To that was added, as in January, the wish for a unified cabinet and parliament after eight years of divided rule and political stalemate. The elec- 
Admittedly, his campaign was effective, at the media level especially, and he put Ma in serious difficulty over his programme for economic rapprochement with China, forcing him to moderate it or spell it out, and over his personal integrity and leadership capacity.
(13) Even so, Hsieh did not campaign enough in person, travelling very little, and did not achieve the personal contact that is fundamental to Taiwanese politics, whereas Ma had toured the country since autumn, with "long stays" in the counties of the south and centre. So while Hsieh's campaign did rally the grassroots of the Pan-Green camp, it did not convince centrist voters or stimulate a higher turnout. On political programmes, some rapprochements were noticed in the course of the campaign.
(14) However the two candidates did express differing views, mainly in a series of televised debates and numerous adverts on the following points:
(15) First, how quickly and how much should economic relations with China be strengthened in light of potential risks, strategic exposure, and economic dependence? Second, which economic and social policies should be developed to maintain Taiwanese prosperity in the areas of tax, sustainable development, and professional training? Third, what priority should be given to asserting Taiwan's national identity? Lastly, the candidates debated their own personal qualities. Now, while the repositioning of Hsieh's economic programme on relations with China did not convince either the radical Pan-Greens, who are opposed, or the centrists who prefer the KMT's original version, Ma's strategy of following the voters' lead on Taiwanese identity and democratic values did strike the right note. Indeed, one of the most important aspects of this vote is that Ma Ying-jeou's victory is based on some fundamental assurances he has given in relation to Taiwan. From the start he declared loud and clear his Taiwanese identity ("I am Taiwanese"), and asserted Taiwan's sovereignty and its independence as the ROC.
(16) He also committed himself to defending that sovereignty, and pledged that Taiwan's future could be decided only by Taiwan's 23 million citizens. Then Ma reaffirmed his attachment to the status quo with China, promising not to pursue unification in the short or medium term (that is, 30 to 50 years) and not to embark on any negotiations on the subject during his term of office. Lastly, he took a firm stand on democracy as the central value of Taiwanese society, setting China's democratisation as the precondition for any future unification. In fact, this position looks back to the conditions of Lee Teng-hui's Reunification Programme of 1991, but imposes far more precise barriers to unification than the positions taken on the question by Lien or Soong. Ma also campaigned on the return to "real Taiwanese values," betrayed, he said, by the DPP. Backed by TV adverts stressing the links between the KMT and Taiwan -some of them in the Taiwanese language -and supported with a new Taiwanisation of the KMT's discourse, Ma and the KMT managed to sever the assumed connection between the DPP and the defence of Taiwanese interests and identity. Lastly, Ma was better able to express the openness to the outside world of the new Taiwanese society created by democracy with his campaign founded on the fresh opportunities of the future. By contrast, the DPP, unlike in the 1990s when it was swept along by the waves of democratisation and Taiwanisation and by the relative youthfulness of its leaders, has been appearing too involved with the past, with Taiwanese heritage, and nostalgia for a passing identity of 12. Cf. Cindy Sui, "Taiwan's Defeated Party Rebuilds," op. cit. (17) Paradoxically, the DPP of today missed the crystallisation of the new Taiwanese identity that it had done so much to create. Now that everyone is a democrat and everyone Taiwanese, even the KMT, it is no longer so necessary to fight for democracy and Taiwanese identity. It is time to look ahead, to seek what is new: this includes China, with its risks and opportunities, and the rest of the world.
T T h he e v v i ie e w w a a h he ea a d d : : T T h hr r e e e e c c h ha al l l le e n ng g e es s f f o or r M M a a
As the new Taiwanese President, Ma Ying-jeou has great expectations to fulfil, notably insuring more peaceful crossStrait relations and greater prosperity at home. Yet, in both cases, many of the answers depend not on him but on the world economy and the attitude of Beijing. At the national level, Ma must quickly keep his promises and respect his commitments to Taiwan's voters. Having centred his electoral campaign on reviving the economy, he will have only a short honeymoon period in which to prove his competence. Also, he must improve relations with Washington, Taipei's indispensable backer. The US is already well disposed towards Ma because of his support for the status quo; but Washington will also have to show that it can help Taiwan at the international level, and will have complex choices to make in balancing its relations with Taiwan on the one hand, and China on the other, particularly in the areas of defence procurement and contacts and the free trade agreement that Taipei is seeking. Lastly, in his relationship with Beijing, Ma will have to exercise extreme caution so as not to appear to betray Taiwan's interests and sovereignty while winning from the Communist leadership what it denied to Chen Shuibian. Thus he will have three main challenges to confront, each linked to the others: the economy, relations with China, and national identity.
T Th he e e ec co on no om my y
Ma has projected himself as the saviour of a failing economy that needs treatment. His programme promises 6 percent growth in 2008, unemployment below 3 percent by 2012, and a per capita GDP of US$30,000 by 2016. To achieve these goals, he is counting on the swift opening up of direct air links with China and a mass influx of tourists from the mainland, the launch of 12 big infrastructure projects costing a total of US$130 billion (25 percent of national GDP), and the transformation of Taiwan into a regional base for foreign multinationals investing in China.
Four years of negative publicity by the pro-Pan-Blue media (that is, two thirds of all Taiwanese media) have finally convinced a fair number of Taiwanese people that their economy is in crisis. The fact is, as we shall show, that the economic balance sheet from the Chen years is good, and the continuous success of the high technology sectors has boosted Taiwanese exports to a succession of new records. (18) Even so, Taiwan faces two problems. The first is the economic restructuring brought about by globalisation and the relocation of businesses, to which all present-day developed economies are subject and face similar difficulties. Like the South Koreans, however, (19) the Taiwanese population tends to forget the new barriers to growth presented by the country's high level of development, and compares its growth figures to those of China or other developing countries such as Vietnam or India, or even with the economies of entrepôt cities and financial centres such as Hong Kong and Singapore; this view generates mistaken assumptions about Taiwan's real performance. The second problem, linked to the first, is the crucial issue of purchasing power and the redistribution of national wealth towards the middle and poorer classes, a problem that affects the whole of the region.
(20) An important argument in the KMT's campaign was to dwell on Taiwan's growing social inequality. This problem is indeed central to the impression of relative decline shared by a section of the population, but it will not be easy to solve. In any case, a comparison with other countries at the same economic level shows Taiwan's position to be quite good. GDP growth during Chen's time, from 2000 to 2007, averaged 4.1 percent per year, (21) compared with 6.5 percent in the 1990s and 8.2 percent in the 1980s. This is a classic feature of industrial and technological development: growth rates decline as national wealth increases. Taking Chen's two terms separately, we see that from 2000 to 2003, average annual growth was 2.9 percent, including a recession in A glance back at the 1990s also shows that the rise in unemployment predates Chen's coming to power. From 1992 to 1995, when unemployment averaged 1.57 percent (1.87 percent between 1979 and 1995), the rate jumped to 2.6 percent in 1996 and remained at an average of 2.73 percent between 1996 and 1999. It was precisely at this time, economists believe, that the shift of Taiwanese manufacturing to Southeast Asia and China at the end of the 1980s began to have a strong negative impact on employment and purchasing power in Taiwan. (26) In terms of social inequality, a marked rise in the income gap between rich and poor was apparent at the start of the 2000s, reflecting the recession and the accelerating rate of industrial migration into China, notably by Taiwan's IT sector. So, while the gap was at its worst during the DPP's period in office, the increase was part of a long-term process that reached its peak during the 2001 recession and has since improved, although remaining higher than 1990s levels. These figures are relatively good in the international context, reflecting a rather egalitarian society in comparison with rising social inequality elsewhere in Asia, especially South Korea. 
Ma Ying-jeou's biggest problem on the economic front, therefore, will be to improve an economy that is doing well but faces acute problems in terms of stagnation of middle and lower class incomes, redistribution of national wealth, and restructuring of the industry and services sectors.
These questions were not really tackled during the electoral campaign, so much of the population tends to believe that the solution to these problems is faster GDP growth, to be achieved in particular by greater economic interaction with China. The fact is, however, that one of the main causes of growing unemployment since the mid-1990s, especially among unskilled workers, is the relocation of labour-intensive industries to China and Southeast Asia.
(33) Another factor is members of the Taiwanese business community, known as Taishang, who have migrated to the mainland and taken their consumption with them; these are mainly entrepreneurs and white collar workers, qualified and well paid, who comprise, with their families, more than a million people, or 5 percent of the Taiwanese population. Lastly, since the mid 1990s, the rise in capital income (finance and property) has outstripped that of earned income, contributing to rising social inequality while low tax revenue (13 percent of GDP) limits redistributing of national wealth. (34) Since the problems are not temporary but structural, the KMT and Ma will find them no easier to solve than did the DPP. Indeed, the promised closer relations with China will intensify the migration of business, no longer affecting only low technology --that relocation was completed by the mid 1990s --but high technology as well, particularly semi-conductors, flat screens, and possibly Taiwan's heavy industry. At the same time, there is no guarantee that the agreement on direct air links with China or increased numbers of Chinese tourists (rising to 3,000-10,000 a day compared with 1,000 now) will bring a real increase in growth and revenue outside the sectors of air transport and tourism. Still more problematic will be the opening up of Taiwan to Chinese investors, particularly in commercial and residential property, when access to house ownership is already increasingly difficult for young families in Taipei, and signs of a real estate bubble have already appeared.
(35) Lastly, the tax cuts announced by the new KMT government are likely to endanger the balanced budget so hard won by the DPP since 2006 (at a time when revenue from taxation is already among the lowest in the industrialised countries), and may encourage the government to resort to debt in order to finance state expenditure. (36) Perhaps more promising is the attempt to change Taiwan into a regional financial centre for the research, development, and logistics needed to take full advantage of China's growth. This project, which Vice-President Siew had already proposed as Prime Minister under Lee Teng-hui (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) , now has better chances of success with the improvement of Taiwan's technical and professional capabilities and the expected opening of direct links with China. These same links should also allow the Taishang to send profits back home, thus restoring some of their consumption to Taiwan, along with that of foreign expatriates in China. The gigantic new infrastructure programme proposed by Ma should also, once its funding has been resolved, provide a spur to public investment and supply much-needed jobs, even though the toughest minimum-wage construction work (at NT$17,000) attracts only immigrant workers from Southeast Asia, as has been the case since the 1990s. It remains to be seen how the new government will manage to further develop the services sector to provide new jobs for both unskilled labourers and professionals while boosting incomes across the board.
R Re el la at ti io on ns s w w i it th h C Ch hi in na a
Relations with China constitute a further major challenge for Ma Ying-jeou, at the political level in particular. The KMT's proposals for closer economic ties should win support from Beijing and from the Taiwanese people as long as they benefit from them. As for the gradual establishment of air links (passenger and cargo) and the opening to Chinese tourists, the technical negotiations between Taipei The basis of Ma's China policy is the acceptance of the "one China, different interpretations" (yizhong gebiao) compromise (which already produced the 1992-3 technical agreements between Taipei and Beijing) and of the concept of "mutual non-denial" between the two capitals. (37) Yet, its success depends almost entirely on China's understanding and goodwill. As the recent encounter between Vincent Siew and Hu Jintao at the Boao Forum suggests, Beijing does seem ready to play the game and to maintain a positive cross-Strait dynamic, while remaining vague about its agreement on the "double interpretation." (38) Ma's victory and the failure of the referendums on Taiwan joining the UN are in fact very good news for Beijing. But with Ma in power, the Chinese Communist government also finds itself in a more complex situation. For eight years, Beijing was easily able to treat Chen as a villain, blaming him for poor cross-Strait relations while demanding his respect for a "one China" concept that was unacceptable to the DPP administration and relying on Washington to apply its Taiwan policy. Although the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has revised its aim of rapid reunification, aiming instead to block Taiwan's progress towards independence, it has hardly moved on the basic principle of recognising the ROC; nor has it proposed any framework for political integration more considerate of Taiwan's wishes and realities than the "one country, two systems" formula. Furthermore, contrary to what the present discourse of the KMT and the CCP might suggest, the recent political tensions between Taiwan and China long predate Chen's accession to power; his policy towards China was essentially a continuation of Lee's. (39) In fact, even if the leaders of the SEF and its Chinese counterpart, ARATS, managed to meet in 1998 in Shanghai, official contacts between the two capitals have almost been at a dead end ever since Lee's 1995 visit to the US, followed by the Chinese missile tests in Taiwanese territorial waters, all that at a time during which the ruling KMT adhered to the so-called "1992 consensus". (40) Beijing will therefore now be obliged to demonstrate that its own inflexibility is not blocking political relations with Taipei; it will have to propose measures that answer Taiwanese expectations of being better represented in international bodies and of an end to the diplomatic war against their country. In Ma Ying-jeou Beijing also comes up against a president who is very attached to the ROC, its legitimacy, and its history. Ma is one of the few politicians, even among mainlanders, to keep alive the flame of the May Fourth Movement, which he has celebrated every year in a public statement. Even more fundamentally, any peace accord between the two sides will be impossible until Beijing acknowledges the fact that all Taiwanese people, the KMT foremost among them, consider the ROC in Taiwan to be a sovereign and independent state. Ma is also concerned about democracy in China, repeatedly asking for an official re-evaluation of the Tiananmen events, religious freedom in China and Tibet, and an end to the repression of Falun Gong, attitudes that hardly endear him to the CCP. (41) Observers will be watching to see what Beijing can offer Ma to maintain the interest and goodwill of the Taiwanese towards China at a time when increasing operating costs (labour and raw materials) are pushing many small and medium-sized Taiwanese businesses to reconsider their presence on the mainland. (42) Ma will need concrete results, and not just symbolic progress, to prove the validity of his China policy. For Washington, Ma's election is also an opportunity for detente that Beijing should not miss. (43) The first tests will be sorting out Taiwan's membership in the WHO and other international organisations and groupings, and at the defence level, a withdrawal or reduction in the number of missiles targeting Taiwan. On his side, Ma has nothing to gain from appearing to cosy up too quickly to Beijing and to compromise with an authoritarian and anti-democratic government. Indeed, much of his presidency's success will depend on his effective defence of the interests and sovereignty of Taiwan, in full respect for the Taiwanese identity of which he has declared himself guarantor. N Na at ti io on na al l i id de en nt ti it ty y Ma's victory and his new Taiwanese identity are the best proof that Chen Shui-bian's two terms in office helped to consolidate the Taiwanese national identity and the Taiwanisation of society as a whole. (44) Ma's victory is of symbolic importance in that he is the first mainlander (waishengren) to be democratically elected President of Taiwan by a population that is 85 percent local (benshengren). It marks the end of an epoch and of a policy based on the distinction between benshengren and waishengren that was first instituted with the arrival of Chiang Kai-shek's troops on the island in 1945, and engendered the political and economic segregation of the benshengren under dictatorship. Democratisation brought a sociopolitical re-adjustment in favour of the benshengren, a process crowned by the election of Chen to the presidency. (45) The ever-growing support of the people for Taiwanese identity, and for Taiwanese independence, is thus in no way contradicted by the return to power of a Taiwanised KMT; (46) rather, the election of Ma marks the emergence at the highest state level of the "new Taiwanese society" through democratisation. It marks, indeed, the success of Lee Teng-hui's policy of Taiwanising the Republic of China and the KMT and of changing mainlanders into "new Taiwanese" (xin taiwanren). (47) Taiwan's successful national self-affirmation and establishment of identity since the 1990s has made these issues of less pressing concern, allowing space for other preoccupations, economic ones in particular. Yet, Taiwanese national identity remains at the heart of political debate. It is built on very particular historical foundations going back to at least 1895, and should prove lasting even though in a constant state of evolution. At the same time, the continuing tensions between the island's political development and its closer economic relations with China have endowed its people with a fervent attachment to the status quo of de jure and de facto sovereignty and independence for Taiwan as the Republic of China, peace on the ground with China, and protection from the US. The majority of Taiwanese people, wishing to preserve what they have and conscious of the Chinese military threat, are ready to soft-pedal their national claims, putting off any resolution of the question until a later date. (48) However, as long as China remains undemocratic and has not reached Taiwan's level of prosperity, there is no chance that the Taiwanese would favour political unification. Indeed, Taiwanese society continues to evolve differently from China's. Whereas during the 1980s some people expected that the effect of trade and capitalism would bring the two societies together, they have actually moved further apart as democracy has become established in Taiwan and a new generation has succeeded the old. The massacre of 28 February 1947 and the Kaohsiung Incident of 1979 no longer resonate much among many young people; this is even more true of the mainlanders' Chinese past and the Qing Empire. More than half of today's population was born after 1970 and came (or will come) to political maturity in a democratic and Taiwanised environment. Few things connect them to Chinese society, whether at the political, social, or cultural levels, or in terms of mentality. Furthermore, despite the naive aspirations of some, close economic and commercial links between two countries have never of themselves created a common national identity, as attested by the case of Canada and the US (although English-speaking Canada is united with its neighbour by language and Anglo-Saxon culture). Admittedly, the growth in the numbers of Taiwanese citizens living in China has redoubled contacts between the two peoples, but that has not necessarily brought the Taiwanese closer to the Chinese or made them stakeholders in the same community. If anything, closer contact has made Taiwanese more aware of the differences between the two societies: living habits, education and behaviour, treatment of others, openness to the outside world, appreciation for foreign cultures and countries (for the US and Japan in particular), experience and knowledge of Chinese culture (religion, art of living, and so on), and, above all, political freedom and democracy, not to mention the respect for Taiwanese culture, the respect for the rule of law and for an impartial legal environment, and Taiwan's social security and health system. Often, the Taiwanese appreciate China mainly as consumers: their approach is financial, careerist, or touristic, with the exception of a small minority attached to Greater Chinese nationalism. Many supporters of the Pan-Blues, including the mainlanders, prefer thus to live in and come home to Taiwan while supporting new economic links and the lowering of tension across the Strait. Understanding all this, Ma tuned his message to the wishes of the Taiwanese people, and they rewarded him with their votes. Now he will have to continue representing the interests of the majority of the Taiwanese who wish to maintain the status quo and not to be dragged by the KMT's radical unificationists into excessive concessions towards Beijing. Democratisation has been an essential element in forming the Taiwanese national identity and its domestic and foreign policies ever since the 1990s. It has enabled the Taiwanese to support Lee Teng-hui's policy of national self-affirmation abroad, and then to oppose Chen Shui-bian's too-rapid pursuit of independence; now it will be the means of controlling the new KMT government's policy on relations with China.
C Co on nc cl l u us si io o n n
The 2008 elections marked the end of the Chen Shui-bian era and ushered in the new Ma era. They also marked the end or at least the decline of ethnic politics in favour of a wider and more solid policy of national identity. Taiwan, a model of democracy for the region and the world, has demonstrated once again that democratic values and human rights are entirely compatible with Chinese or Asian culture. Numerous issues now await Ma's attention, most particularly the national "reconciliation" that people are hoping for after years of ideological tension. His choice of a former TSU deputy close to Lee Teng-hui as the new Minister for Mainland Affairs is a first gesture towards the ProIndependence camp.
(49) However more will be needed to ease the Greens' anxiety about the real depth of Ma's new Taiwanese identity in regard to his known Chinese nationalism. For the rest, the incoming governmental team is composed mainly of old KMT technocrats (with past experience of the country's administrative affairs during the 1990s) and academics. It projects itself also as a government of experts in the service of the economy and the people. The Taiwanese people are thirsty for international status and recognition and will soon demand from the new administration practical results in this area. But if Ma manages to keep his promises and to improve the situation of the middle class while respecting Taiwanese identity, he might become a very popular president, and barring accidents, may position himself favourably for re-election in 2012. 
